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IMPLIED WARRANTY
takes the life of the insured. Unfortunately, the benefits gained
through such guidance are more than offset by the unjust manner in
which the court reached its final result. Besides the unfairness on the
peculiar facts of this case, the abandonment of the heretofore univer-
sally recognized common-law test of intent to kill has the potential for
producing results that most courts and commentators would find
inequitable. 9 For example, under the rule laid down by the court in
Quick, a son whose reckless driving caused the death of his father
would not be allowed to recover any insurance proceeds accruing as
a result of his father's death.
It is submitted that the court should have remanded the case for a
hearing to determine whether Jill Quick intentionally killed the in-
insured. In disposing of the case in this manner, the court could have
avoided setting an unwarranted and inequitable precedent in North
Carolina.
JOHN MULL GARDNER
Real Property-Implied Warranty: Seller of Land Limited by
Restrictive Covenants Implicitly Warrants That the Land Was
Usable for the Restricted Purpose
In a case of first impression and without appellate court precedent
in any other jurisdiction,' the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the venerable maxim that in a sale of land by deed there are no implied
warranties.2 By extending the implied warranty concept developed for
new home sales,3 the court created a new substantive right based on
69. E.g., Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Ore. 1952).
1. Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102
(1975). But cf. Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (S. Ct.
1932) where it was held a landlord who specifically restricts the use of a leased premise
for one purpose guarantees the fitness of the premise for that particular purpose.
2. Huntley v. Waddell, 34 N.C. 33 (1851). In some states the prohibition against
implied warranties for real property is statutorily sanctioned. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 93.140 (1973). In these states it is unlikely that the decision of Hinson v. Jefferson,
287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) can be followed without statutory changes, implied
warranty cases for new homes notwithstanding. Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019
(1974) (en bane). For unlike the implied warranty in new home cases in which the
courts attempt to avoid merger and preserve the contractual obligations, the implied
warranty in Hinson is derived from the deed itself. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
3. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974). The case is analyzed
in Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quality in New Housing
Sales: New Protection for the North Carolina Homebuyer, 53 N.C.L. Rnv. 1090 (1975)
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implied warranty for lands covered by restrictive covenants. As formu-
lated in Hinson v. Jefferson,4 whenever a deed contains a restrictive
covenant that limits the use of conveyed property to one specific use, the
grantor implicitly warrants that the land conveyed was at the time of the
conveyance usable for the purpose to which it was specifically limited.
The decision is significant because it carves out a limited exception
to the doctrine of caveat emptor and thus provides greater protection for
the purchaser. The basis for the Hinson decision was not consumer
protection, however. The state supreme court was dissatisfied with the
vagaries of alternative restitutionary theories, such as mistake, particu-
larly in the light of the countervailing policy in favor of stability in
executed land sales. The Hinson warranty was thus created to ensure
greater certainty.5 An examination of the opinion reveals, however,
that failure by the court to discuss the substantive issues that inhere in
warranty actions could undermine its efforts.6
In 1971, "defendants sold a small parcel of land in rural Pitt County
to plaintiff, Mrs. Hinson, for $3,500.7 Contained within the deed
that conveyed the parcel were restrictive covenants that greatly limited
the use of the land. Foremost among these restrictions was the require-
ment that the land be used exclusively for residential purposes." Be-
cause the lot was not serviced by a municipal sewage system, Mrs.
Hinson applied to the Pitt County Health Department for the required
permit for the installation of a septic tank or an on-site sewage disposal
system.' Subsequent inspections by the Health Department and the
United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service dis-
closed that the lot purchased by Mrs. Hinson was only 2.6 feet above the
water level of the Black Swamp. Consequently, unless several hundred
thousand dollars were expended for channel improvements the lot could
and Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina, 11 WAKE
FoRsESr L REv. 155 (1975).
4. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
5. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 30-49 infra.
7. 287 N.C. at 424, 427, 215 S.E.2d at 104, 105.
8. Id. at 424-25, 215 S.E.2d at 104. In addition to restricting the parcel to
exclusively residential uses, according to the covenants no residence at all was permitted
on the parcel unless its construction cost exceeded $25,000. Id. at 424, 215 S.E.2d at
104. The deed prohibited the placing of trailers and mobile homes on the parcel. Id.
Similarly, subdividing the lot into smaller lots was also prohibited. Id. at 425, 215
S.E.2d at 104. Finally, prior to any construction the buyer was required to submit the
building plans and specifications to the defendants for their written approval. Id. at 424,
215 S.E.2d at 104.
9. Id. at 425-26, 215 S.E.2d at 105.
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not comply with septic tank or on-site sewage disposal regulations.
10
Neither the buyer nor the seller knew of the subterranean hydrologic
conditions of the lot."1 Unable to build because of these, conditions,
Mrs. Hinson attempted to rescind the deed. The trial court held for
defendants.
1 2
The court of appeals refused to adopt plaintiffs implied warranty
theory13 but accepted the mutual mistake contention and reversed the
trial court.14 The court relied extensively on MacKay v. Mcintosh, 5 an
earlier North Carolina case in which a Florida realty company attempted
to specifically enforce an executory land contract made by its agent and
the buyer. The facts revealed, however, that prior to signing the
contract of sale the buyer advised the seller's agent that her sole purpose
for acquiring the property was to build a retail store. The agent assured
her that the property was zoned for business purposes when in fact the
local zoning ordinances prohibited business uses. The North Carolina
Supreme Court therefore accepted defendant's contention that both
parties acted on an honest mistake and rescinded the contract. 16 The
MacKay decision recognized, however, that generally a contract is bind-
ing and only when a mistake was of a material fact which formed the
basis of a contract could a contract be voided on the grounds of mutual
mistake.' 7
10. Id. at 426, 215 S.E.2d at 105.
11. Id. at 427, 215 S.E.2d at 105-06.
12. Id. at 427-28, 215 S.E.2d at 106.
13. Id. at 429, 215 S.E.2d at 107. At the appeals court it was contended that the
deed should be rescinded for either of two reasons. First, the terms and conditions of
the covenants restricting the use of the conveyed property to a single use gave rise to a
mutually dependent warranty on behalf of the grantor that the land was in fact usable
for its restricted purpose. Second, since neither party knew about the high watertable at
the time of the conveyance, a mutual mistake concerning the utility of the parcel had
occurred. Two other contentions, although not made, appear relevant. First plaintiff
could have argued that an existing impossibility at the outset of the transaction
invalidated the deed. See D. DOBBs, HANDnOOK ON THE LAW OF REmmDIEs 965-66
(1973). The impossibility theory, however, is subject to the same basic uncertainties as
the mistake cases, id. at 965, and would probably have been rejected by the supreme
court. Second, it could be argued that since it was impossible to comply with the
restrictive covenant and build the contemplated single family house, *the restrictions
should be removed to permit development of the land for some other purpose. See, e.g.,
Abate v. Hebert, 100 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). However, under this
approach purchasers can receive a windfall since presumably their purchase price
reflected the restricted use of the property. Thus the effect of this type of decision is to
give the buyer an unrestricted fee at restricted prices. Furthermore, if the property was
within a subdivision, removal of the covenant may adversely affect -the interests and
expectations of neighboring property owners.
14. Hinson v. Jefferson, 24 N.C. App. 231, 238-39, 210 S.3E.2d 498, 502-03 (1974).
15. 270 N.C. 69, 153 S.E.2d 800 (1967).
16. Id. at 73, 153 S.E.2d at 804.
17. Id.
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The state supreme court in Hinson replaced the mistake rationale
of the court of appeals with a warranty theory. The court feared that
the mistake doctrine was too uncertain a standard to rescind a complet-
ed land transaction.18 Recent writings and cases lend support to this
fear. One commentator has observed that in any mistake case the
several factors' 9 used by the courts may point toward different results,
and one factor although important in one case may be ignored in
another. Consequently neither lawyer nor judge can be assured what
factors will be decisive in a particular case. 20  Even when a definite
standard is developed, it is difficult to apply. In MacKay, it will be
recalled, the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that the sine qua
non for applying the mistake doctrine was that the mistake form the
basis of the contract.2 Although easily stated, in practice this test is
extremely difficult to apply. Differentiating between basic and collat-
eral matters is highly subjective. The Michigan Supreme Court, for
example, refused to apply the mistake doctrine in A&M Land Develop-
ment Co. v. Miller, even though nearly one-half of the ninety-one lots
purchased were unsuitable for septic tanks, the only available form of
sewage disposal.22 The court simply held that the buyer received the
property for which he contracted.2 1 Generally, when the courts apply
the mistake doctrine their decisions are predicated on their perceptions
about culpability, assumption of risk, and the relative hardships to the
parties.24 Although this balancing approach may reach an equitable
result in a particular case it fails to provide any guidance to the seller or
the purchaser.2 5 In the Hinson case this uncertainty was, in the judg-
ment of the supreme court, fatal to the mistake cause of action.
In contrast, a warranty action minimizes the discretionary judg-
ment of the courts, and therefore increases the control the parties have
over their own transaction. As applied in Hinson the warranty of
fitness is coextensive with the restrictive covenant of the deed.20  Thus,
the legal obligations of the parties are defined by the provisions of the
deed executed by the parties rather than by retrospective and unpredict-
18. 287 N.C. at 430-33, 215 S.E.2d at 108-09.
19. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
20. Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in
Bargain Transactions, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1273, 1275 (1967).
21. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
22. 354 Mich. 681, 94 N.W.2d 197 (1959).
23. Id. at 694, 94 N.W.2d at 203.
24. D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 723-32.
25. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
26. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
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able judicial analysis of factors such as culpability, unjust enrichment, or
relative hardship. Another advantage of the Hinson opinion is the
lighter evidentiary burden required to sustain a warranty action. Gen-
erally, plaintiffs in a warranty action must prove only: (1) the exist-
ence of a warranty; (2) the scope of the warranty; and (3) that the
breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss.27 By
contrast, because the mistake cases are based on subjective evaluations,
the evidence required to prevail is much greater. This does not mean,
however, that the warranty doctrine applied in Hinson removes all
factual disputes. One very important but difficult element critical to the
buyer's cause of action under the Hinson rationale is proving that at the
time of the conveyance the property was unusable for its restricted
purpose. If either the seller or the purchaser had actually known the
physical condition of the lan($ at the time of the conveyance, the
transaction undoubtedly would not have occurred in its present form.
The passage of substantial periods of time between the conveyance and
actual development will exacerbate the problem of proof.
28
The major difficulty with a warranty action and the Hinson deci-
sion in particular is not evidentiary but substantive. The decision leaves
too many important warranty issues unresolved. Moreover, since
the opinion departs substantially from previous statutory and case analo-
gies,29 these analogies are inadequate guides to resolve these issues
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (1965), Comment 13.
28. The evidentiary problem was not at issue in Hinson; the Court determined that
the physical conditions existed at the date of the conveyance. 287 N.C. at 426, 215
S.E.2d at 105. The evidentiary problem is closely related to selecting an appropriate
statute of limitations. This problem has troubled many commentators discussing the
implied warranty in new home cases. Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of
Workmanlike Quality in New Housing Sales: New Protection for the North Carolina
Homebuyer, 53 N.C.L Rnv. 1090, 1094 n.28 (1975). Generally, the duration of the
warranty adopted by the courts in the new home area has been a case by case test of
reasonableness. Id. at n.30. Although the types of defects in the Hinson context are less
numerous than in new home construction (see text accompanying note 40 infra), none-
theless, the reasonableness standard is preferable to some fixed period. The reason for
this lies with the nature of the product. Unlike goods which are used immediately after
purchase, realty is sometimes acquired for future use and defects cannot be determined
until later.
29. There are at least three analogous warranties. First, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-
315 (1965) provides:
[wihere the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
The second is the implied warranty of workmanlike quality for new homes. Hartley v.
Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974). Finally, a third analogy is the
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without further court elaboration. In this respect the Hinson decision
suffers from the same lack of guidance the court found so objectionable
in the mistake cases.
The first serious omission in the Hinson decision was the court's
failure to delineate a standard for determining what conditions consti-
tute a breach of warranty. Because the land in Hinson was totally
unusable in any practical sense for its restricted use,30 it was clear that if
a warranty existed at all, it was breached. Suppose however, the
contemplated use was not frustrated but instead was $3,000 more costly
to achieve. Would this constitute a breach of warranty under Hinson?
Similarly, suppose the land was restricted to both single and multifamily
housing, and later it was learned that the land was only suitable for
single family housing. Clearly the value of the land is worth less, but
does this constitute a breach of an implied warranty? Although the
Hinson decision is silent about these circumstances, it hints at a strict
standard of liability. First, unlike analogies from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code"1 and implied warranties for new homes,32 where it is
inferred that the businessman has superior knowledge on which the
consumer relies, neither the seller nor the buyer had knowledge of the
hydrologic conditions03 in Hinson. Apparently, the court believed, as
between two innocent parties, the party who imposed the restriction
ought to bear the risks that are attributable to the restrictions. Second,
in contrast to Hartley v. Ballou3 4 and its kindred cases, 35 the Hinson
decision omits language limiting the scope of liability. Whenever the
courts have resorted to implied warranties and imposed liability in the
past, as in the case of defective new home construction, they have
carefully circumscribed the scope of liability.36 For example, in Hartley
the North Carolina Supreme Court specifically held that the implied
landlord's implied warranty of habitability. See Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALiF. L. Ray. 1444 (1974).
30. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-315 (1965); Covington & Medved, The Implied
Warranty of Fitness for A Particular Purpose: Some Persistent Problems, 9 GA. L. REv.
149, 151 (1975).
32. Commentary, Real Property-Implied Warranties-Sale of House by Builder-
Vendor Creates an Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 24 ALA. L. REv. 332,
335 (1972).
33. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
34. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
35. See generally Annot., 25 A.L'R.3d 383, 413-15 (1969).
36. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) the Idaho Supreme
Court held "[t]he implied warranty of fitness does not impose upon the builder an
obligation to deliver a perfect house. No house is built without defects. . . ." Id. at
68, 415 P.2d at 711.
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warranty fell short of an absolute guarantee.a7 Therefore, in North
Carolina liability for new home construction is imposed only when
there is a breach of workmanlike quality."8 In other states habita-
bility39 and reasonableness standards4" are used to limit liability.
These limitations are, however, based on policy considerations which
are inapplicable to the Hinson land purchase context. The courts, for
example, have recognized that there are too many considerations in-
volved with housing construction and maintenance to require a builder-
vendor or a landlord to build or rent a perfect house and that an
absolute standard of liability would be unreasonable.41 By contrast, the
concern in Hinson is unidimensional- whether the parcel is suitable to
accommodate the restricted use--and as such, the seller can more easily
avoid liability. Another important policy difference between Hartley
and Hinson is the disparate transactional impact of the two decisions.
Since the courts are involved with the indispensable commodity of
shelter when deciding housing warranty cases, their decisions are likely
to have broad societal consequences. For example, unreasonable court
requirements could discourage housing construction, encourage disin-
vestment in housing, or increase drastically the cost of housing to
consumers. However, since the fact situation in Hinson occurs less
frequently, its probable impact is slight. Therefore, in this situation the
courts should be willing to include lesser impairments within the protec-
tive scope of the warranty.
Finally, a stricter standard of liability is consistent with the remedi-
al flexibility provided by a warranty action.42 Unlike the Hobbesian all-
or-nothing choice of the mistake cases where the remedy is generally
37. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966).
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Dev., 479 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Mo. 1972) (en
bane).
41. For a listing of the multitudinous types of defects that can occur in new home
construction, see Commentary, Real Property-Implied Warranties--Sale of House by
Builder-Vendor Creates an Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 24 ALA. I
RaV. 332, 338-39 n.30 (1972). In the landlord-tenant field, although the landlord is not
liable for all defects, Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974), certain general principles have emerged for imposing
liability on landlords. When defects deprive tenants of essential services, such as
bathing, sleeping, and eating, liability is imposed. Similarly, liability is upheld when
tenants are exposed to hazardous conditions which would result in tort liability if injury
actually occurred. Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1444, 1455-62 (1974).
42. For a discussion about the advantages of a warranty action and when a
landowner may want damages instead of rescission, see Skillern, Implied Warranties in
Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER LJ. 387, 391-93 (1967).
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limited to rescission,"3 damages are an available alternative in a breach
of warranty action." Thus, in other fact patterns, in which the hard-
ship to the buyer is less severe than in Hinson, the courts can avoid the
difficulties45 of rescission and subsequent changes in property records by
giving the buyer either the difference between the market value as
implicitly warranted and the market value in its actual condition or the
amount of money required to bring the property into compliance with
the implied warranty."
The second major shortcoming of the Hinson decision related to the
issue of liability is uncertainty about the right of the buyer and seller to
exclude the implied warranty. Nowhere in the decision is this problem
discussed. However, if the court applied the Uniform Commercial
Code warranty of fitness analogy to the restrictive covenant warranty,
then clearly a waiver clause is permissible. The code expressly pro-
vides a simple procedure for excluding implied warranties.47 However,
despite the obvious statutory parallel, the case law is hostile to waiver
clauses. In new housing sales this hostility is evidenced by restrictive
interpretation given to waiver clauses. 4" The courts are even more
adamantly opposed to waiver clauses in cases involving landlords' im-
plied warranty of habitability. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court has held that a tenant does not waive the protection of an implied
warranty even when he accepts a patently defective premise for reduced
monthly rental payments.49 Whether this reasoning will be followed by
43. See 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1542 (3d ed. 1970).
44. See Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 63, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974).
45. Id. at 490, 219 S.E.2d at 194; see text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
46. Cf. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 63, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-316(3)(a) (1965) provides: ". . . [AIIU implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like as is, with all faults, or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty .... "
48. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1101, 449 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1970);
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
49. Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d, 160 (1973). In Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970), Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625 n.9, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 n.9, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 n.9 (1974), and Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293
N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973), explicit waiver clauses were not enforced by the courts.
The decisions are based on two reasons. The Javins decision, for example, relied on the
landlords' independent statutory duty imposed by the housing code to provide tenants
with habitable premises as the basis for its opinion. Viewed in this context the
prohibition against waiver clauses merely illustrates the principle that private parties can
not by agreement remove a statutory duty. See Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C.&St. L.
Ry., 96 F. 298, 302 (6th Cir. 1899). Another reason which is given to support the
court's determination that a tenant may not waive the implied warranty of habitability
centers on the adverse societal impact of renting substandard housing. Foisy v. Wyman,
[Vol. 541104
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North Carolina courts in the Hinson land purchase context is uncer-
tain.50 It would be anomalous, however, for the court to create a
warranty right based on a policy of stability and then allow the buyer
and seller to easily undermine this policy. For if the mere inclusion of a
waiver clause can protect sellers from an implied warranty action,
buyers would have no choice but to sue on a mistake theory, and thus
reintroduce the uncertainty the court attempted to prevent.
The third critical issue for a warranty action left unanswered by the
Hinson decision is deciding which individuals are protected by the
warranty. Traditionally, North Carolina has taken a restrictive attitude
towards privity.51 In Hartley, for example, the implied warranty of
workmanship protected only the "initial vendee." 52  hi Hinson, how-
ever, the warranty of the grantor extends to the initial grantee and any
subsequent grantees through mesne conveyances.5 3 The reason for this
departure from past precedent is not discussed in the opinion. More
importantly, it is unclear whether the court truly intends to protect all
subsequent buyers. For example, the implied warranty does not
protect a buyer with knowledge. The decision therefore fails to pro-
vide a framework for determining when privity should be extended to
subsequent grantees.
A solution for obviating this confusion is for the court in future
cases firmly to equate the Hinson warranty to privity decisions under
restrictive covenant law. 4 Apparently, the supreme court had this in
mind when it held that the restrictive covenants in Hinson ran with the
land.5 5  The advantage of such a holding is twofold. First it would
provide lawyers with a readily identifiable area of the law from which
83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164-65. Whether these policies can be used to extend
the prohibition against waiving implied warranties to other areas is uncertain. Pappas v.
Hershberger, 85 Wash. 2d 152, 530 P.2d 642 (1975) (per curiam) (en banc).
50. The North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that implied warranties do
not protect buyers from patent defects or from reasonably ascertainable facts. Hinson v.
Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 436, 215 S.E.2d 102, 111.
51. See, e.g., Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753
(1964); Byrd & Dobbs, Torts Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L. REv. 906,
936-38 (1965).
52. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
53. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
54. See, e.g., Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949).
55. 287 N.C. at 424, 215 S.E.2d at 104. It is not clear, however, whether
characterizing the covenants in Hinson as running with the land is correct. In Julian v.
Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 440, 82 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1954), the court held that a covenant
providing among other things that no building should be erected unless approved by the
grantor or by an architect selected by him was a covenant personal to the grantor.
Accord, Chappell v. Winslow, 144 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1944).
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they can delimit the warranty obligations. Second, because restrictive
covenants that run with the land cannot be altered by subsequent
buyers5 absent court assistance,"1 it is only equitable that the original
grantor who imposed the restriction be held liable.
Although the Hinson decision has left many important questions
unanswered and therefore has undermined the efforts of the court to
achieve stability in the land market, nevertheless, the problems are not
insurmountable and future decisions along the lines suggested can
achieve the desired objectives of the court. However, the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court's novel decision in Hinson v. Jefferson does reflect an
increasing willingness on behalf of the court to use implied warranties to
protect purchasers of real property. Moreover, the decision may fore-
shadow future expansion of the implied warranty doctrine to other
areas, such as landlord tenant relations.
IRA J. BOTVINICK
Security Interests-Garagemen's Liens and Duress of Goods
The doctrine that an artisan who enhances the value of a chattel
at the request of its owner has a lien on that chattel for his reasonable
charges is deeply rooted in the common law.' Equally venerable is
the concept of duress of goods, a rule that protects an individual who
finds himself coerced in some fashion through the wrongful seizure or
detention of his property.' These two principles are similar in that
each finds its application in a bailment of goods situation. 3 In Adder
v. Holman & Moody, Inc.,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court was pre-
sented with a question that involved an interplay between the two
concepts: whether duress of goods was perpetrated when a garageman
insisted that an owner-bailor sign a document purporting to waive all
defenses based on poor workmanship before the garageman relin-
quished an automobile on which he had made repairs. The court, in
56. Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N.C. 426, 431, 20 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1942).
57. E.g., Muilenburg v. Blevins, 262 N.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 493 (1955).
1. R. BRowN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.1, at 394-95 (3d ed. 1975);
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33.2, at 873 (1965).
2. This concept had its origin in the early eighteenth century. See note 23 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 23-35 infra.
4. 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
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